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WHINNEY AND WATERHOUSE’S GOVERNMENT ASSIGNMENT 1887-1888: 
A STUDY OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE  
 
Abstract: The episode narrated in this paper is situated in late-Victorian Britain 
when leading chartered accountants, Frederick Whinney and Edwin Waterhouse, 
were engaged by a British parliamentary committee to examine the costing and 
accountability practices of the government’s military manufacturing 
establishments (GMMEs). The contributions of this study to accounting’s 
historiography are two-fold. First, the significance of Whinney and Waterhouse’s 
appointment for the status of chartered accountants in late-Victorian Britain is 
assessed. Second, Whinney and Waterhouse’s criticisms of existing accounting 
routines are examined and evaluated as is the impact of their findings on the 
subsequent course of accounting practices within GMMEs.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, consultancy work ranks high in the range of services offered by chartered 
accountants in Britain, and it is a major source of fee income [Auditing the Auditors, 
2013, p. 34]. But the willingness of accountants to undertake consultancy work is by no 
means confined to the modern era [Matthews et al., 1998]. The majority of consultancy 
engagements in the past, as is the case today, were undertaken on behalf of the business 
sector, but there were occasions, early on, when central government availed itself of the 
services of public accountants. An important signal of government recognition of 
professional accountants as suppliers of consultancy services occurred in 1887 when 
Frederick Whinney and Edwin Waterhouse were engaged to report on the accounting 
practices employed at the British government’s military manufacturing establishments 
(GMMEs). 
Whinney and Waterhouse (W&W) were leading accountants of the second half of 
the nineteenth century. In the early 1880s Whinney was in practice with the foremost 
corporate liquidator of the day, Robert Palmer Harding [Carnegie, 2004]. Their firm and 
its successors are the main progenitors of what became Ernst & Whinney in 1979, and is 
now Ernst & Young. Waterhouse jointly founded a firm whose name lives on in today’s 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Both men were active in the development of professional 
2 
 
organizations in England: Whinney served as President of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) from 1884 to 1888 [Jones, 2004b] as did 
Waterhouse between 1892 and 1894 [Jones, 2004a]. Whinney was therefore President at 
the time his services were called upon by the government, and he “selected” 
Waterhouse to assist him [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2041].1  
Whinney was not the state’s first choice. Waterhouse’s personal diaries include a 
letter to his wife, Georgina, containing the following: “I am amused at being requested 
to call on Lord Randolph Churchill2 on Wednesday, as he thinks he can make use of me 
in his investigation into the accounts of the Woolwich Arsenal” [quoted in Jones, 1988, 
p. 124].3 At the time of their meeting (July 16, 1887) Churchill was chairing the Select 
Committee on Army and Navy Estimates which, inter alia, focused attention on the 
accounting practices of the Britain’s GMMEs. At their meeting, Waterhouse and 
Churchill informally discussed “the line of action to be adopted by the committee” 
[quoted in Jones, 1988, p. 124]. Waterhouse subsequently visited the House of 
Commons, on a couple of occasions,4 to follow the Select Committee’s proceedings. 
Waterhouse’s observations from the public gallery led him to conclude that he “may 
have been of assistance to the chairman in the hints I conveyed to him as to the nature of 
the questions on the accounts which he might put to the witnesses” [quoted in Jones, 
1988, p. 124].  
At the end of its initial deliberations the Select Committee recommended the 
appointment of professional accountants to investigate the accounting practices 
employed at GMMEs, with Churchill favoring Waterhouse to fulfil that role. One of the 
Select Committee’s members – Edward Stanhope, Secretary of State for War (1887-
1892) – objected to Waterhouse’s proposed appointment because Stanhope recognised 
him “in the Committee Room as a somewhat too interested onlooker” [Waterhouse 
quoted in Jones, 1988, p. 124]. Honour was satisfied when Whinney, who was next 
approached, “[h]aving regard to the circumstances”, suggested that the consultancy 
                                                        
1
 Parliamentary papers cited, and images reproduced therefrom, in this paper have been sourced from ProQuest’s collection of ǲHouse of Commons Parliamentary Papersǳ which are 
accessed at: parlipapers.proquest.com. 
2
 Lord Randolph Churchill was the father of the most famous British political figure of modern 
times, Winston Churchill.  
3
 It is not known why Churchill chose to approach Waterhouse to investigate the Woolwich Arsenal, 
though Waterhouse does make the following comment: “I thought some one of our class would be called 
in, and am pleased to find it is myself!” [quoted in Jones, 1988, p. 124]. 
4
 Quite likely these visits took place on July 22 and July 26, 1887 when the Accountant and Auditor 
to the War Office, Charles James Hurst, was interviewed. 
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engagement be conducted jointly with Waterhouse [Waterhouse quoted in Jones, 1988, 
p. 124]. This did not prove to be an entirely satisfactory professional liaison, at least 
from Waterhouse’s viewpoint: “I was by no means satisfied with this piece of 
accountant’s work, but it is possible that I should not have done better if I had a freer 
hand” [Jones, 1988, p. 125].5 
Focusing on the consequences of W&W’s appointment, this paper has two inter-
related objectives. First, at a time when chartered accountants in England were 
beginning to pursue, actively, their professional project, we consider the significance of 
W&W’s high-profile consultancy engagement for their standing within the public 
domain. Second, the study seeks to improve our knowledge of the development of 
accounting practices within Britain’s GMMEs which have, to date, received little 
attention from accounting historians [Funnell, 2009]. This lacuna does not exist in 
certain mainland European countries with, for example, the accounting practices of 
royal arsenals located in Italy in the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries and in Spain in the 
eighteenth century the subjects of significant research endeavors [e. g. Zan, 2004; 
Gutiérrez et al., 2005; Zambon and Zan, 2007].  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We begin by reviewing 
evidence of state recognition of the rising status of the accounting occupational group in 
nineteenth-century Britain. Second, the concerns with military accounting practices that 
led to W&W’s appointment are summarized. W&W’s consultancy report is then studied 
as is their oral evidence when called before a government Select Committee for cross 
examination. The main changes subsequently made to accounting practices within the 
GMMEs are next identified. Concluding remarks assess the significance of Waterhouse 
and Whinney’s report for changes in government accounting practices and for the 
accounting occupational group’s professionalization process.  
 
STATE LEGITIMISATION OF PROFESSIONAL STATUS 
Studies of the history of professions over the last 30 years have caused the prior 
assumption that such institutions must necessarily be “a good thing” for the public to be 
superseded a more critical assessment of their role within society. Nearly two decades 
ago the British sociologist Keith Macdonald [1995, p. xii] captured this transition in the 
                                                        
5
 As noted below, however, W&W’s Report was judged to have made a valuable contribution to the 
development of accounting practices within GMMEs, and further government engagements followed for 
Waterhouse. 
4 
 
following question “How do such occupations manage to persuade society to grant them 
a privileged position?.” Accountants have done so in two ways. First by demonstrating 
the value of the services they provide in the market-place and, second, by engaging in a 
“professional project” designed to convince society of their claim to professional 
recognition [Macdonald, 1995, chapter 7; Matthews et al., 1998]. Although individuals 
styled themselves “Accomptant” before that date, it was the eighteenth century which 
saw the emergence of the accounting practitioner. During the following century, where 
the story depicted in this paper is located, the number of public accountants spiraled 
and, increasingly, they became recognised as expert practitioners through the provision 
of a coherent range of specialist services based on their jurisdiction over the technique 
of double entry bookkeeping and their ability to compete successfully with other 
occupational groups [Abbott, 1988; Edwards et al., 2007]. 
The successful pursuit of a “professional project,” a concept articulated by Larson 
[1977; see also Krause, 1971], is expedited by state recognition of services supplied by 
that occupational group.6 A strong-form of recognition consists of a state register of 
competent personnel permitted to supply a defined service, as was bestowed on medical 
practitioners in 1858 through An Act to Regulate the Qualifications of Practitioners in 
Medicine and Surgery [21 & 22 Vict., c. 90]. That level of state recognition has never 
been achieved by the accounting profession, but weaker forms of state 
acknowledgement of the specialist expertise possessed by public accountants are more 
conspicuous, and the various ways in which this was done are reviewed in the 
remainder of this section.  
Way back in the 1710s Parliament instructed the “Accomptant,” Charles Snell, to 
investigate the affairs of a firm belonging to one of the directors of the infamous South 
Sea Company. Moving closer to the time-period covered by this paper, William Quilter 
was invited, in 1849, to give evidence before the Select Committee on the Audit of 
Railway Accounts. Ten years later, the government appointed his firm, Quilter, Ball & 
Co., to investigate the accounts of the Army Clothing Store at Weedon [Matthews et al., 
1998, p. 121] and, on a number of other occasions, to make confidential reports on 
private firms planning conversion into limited companies [Obituary of William Quilter, 
reproduced in Parker, 1980, n. p.]. The public accountant Peter Harriss Abbott was 
another “who did much to alert British government to the expert contribution of public 
                                                        
6
 For a review of research into the nature of professions and its application to studies of the history of 
the accounting profession, see Macdonald [1995], Poullaos [2009] and West [2003]. 
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accountants in administering affairs of state” [Edwards, 2001, p. 679]. The Bankruptcy 
Act 1831 signaled parliamentary recognition of accountants, along with merchants, 
brokers “or persons who are or have been engaged in trades in the Cities of London or 
Westminster” [1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 56, s. 22], as eligible for appointment by the Lord 
Chancellor to serve as official assignees in the administrations of a bankrupt’s affairs.  
Another public accountant worthy of mention is David Chadwick who served as the 
first president of the Manchester Institute of Chartered Accountants, established in 
1871. Chadwick's “national importance as an industrial financier” saw him invited to 
give evidence to the 1867 Select Committee on the Limited Liability Acts and, ten years 
later, by which time he was a Member of Parliament for Macclesfield, to serve on the 
Select Committee on the Companies Acts [Cottrell, 2004]. On each occasion Chadwick 
enthusiastically advocated the introduction of a statutory requirement for companies to 
publish accounts in a standardized format – something which did not become a statutory 
obligation in Britain until 1981. Closer to the key actors in this paper is Whinney’s 
partner, Robert Palmer Harding, who, after serving as the second President of the 
ICAEW (1882-1883), left the profession to take up the appointment of Chief Official 
Receiver in Bankruptcy; an office created by the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. His services in 
that capacity caused him to become the first chartered accountant to receive state 
recognition in the form a knighthood [Carnegie, 2004]. 
It is certainly the case that Britain’s legislative assembly provided opportunities for 
work which an energetic occupational group with economic and social aspirations was 
determined to exploit. The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 made readily available an 
organizational structure which increasingly required business and financial services that 
public accountants were able to supply. More specifically, the Act imposed an external 
audit for companies generally,7 as did statutes directed at railway companies in 1867 
and banks in 1879. None of these enactments stated that the service should be provided 
by a public accountant, though market forces gradually decided that this should happen. 
Occasionally, Acts of Parliament entering the statute books in nineteenth-century 
Britain indicated the suitability of “public accountants” as providers of newly created 
services, as occurred when the Bankruptcy Act 1831 identified appropriate 
qualifications for an appointment as official assignee. Further statutory recognition of 
accountants as members of a skilled occupational group ensued when the Friendly 
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 This requirement was repealed in 1856 and reintroduced by the Companies Act 1900 (63 & 
64 Vict. c. 48, ss. 21-23). 
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Societies Act 1875 [38 & 39 Vict., c. 60, s. 30(9)] stipulated that the annual return made 
by larger societies should be “certified by some person not an officer of the society 
(otherwise than as auditor thereof), carrying on publicly the business of an accountant.”  
A broader form of state recognition occurred when the existing accounting societies 
based in England succeeded in obtaining the award of a Royal Charter to signal the 
creation, by merger, of the ICAEW in 1880. This provided a mechanism – the label 
chartered accountant – to enable the public to distinguish the reputable from the soi-
disant accountant [Leading Article, 1874, p. 2; Walker, 2004] who damaged the public 
image that “proper” accountants were striving to create. In so doing, the new Charter 
resonated with The Medical Act 1875 which enabled “Persons requiring Medical Aid … 
to distinguish qualified from unqualified Practitioners.” The Charter also identified its 
anticipated role in the upward trajectory of the accounting occupational group, namely 
that differentiation, through incorporation, would result in “public recognition of the 
importance of the profession and would tend to gradually raise its character and thus to 
secure for the community the existence of a class of persons well qualified to be 
employed in the responsible and difficult duties often devolving on public accountants” 
[ICAEW, 1881, p. 197].  
The above events are recounted as examples of ways in which, through interaction 
with the state, public accountants were in the process of transforming their public 
identity from broad occupational group to expert professional. The significance of 
W&W’s appointment, as part of this transformation, is discussed in the next sub-
section. 
 
“Signal of movement” towards professional status: Lord Randolph Churchill, as Leader 
of the House of Commons and Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury’s 
Conservative government (1885-1886), ranked “second only to Salisbury in the 
ministerial hierarchy” [Quinault, 2004]. Churchill was a determined advocate of 
retrenchment in public finances and, in pursuit of that objective, sought to reduce 
substantially the state’s expenditure on defense. In the endeavor to impose his will, and 
overcome stiff opposition from the Secretary of State for War, W. H. Smith (1886-
1887), Churchill threatened to resign his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The 
ploy failed and Salisbury accepted Churchill's resignation with “profound regret” on 
December 20, 1886 [quoted in Quinault, 2004]. Churchill’s resignation speech to the 
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House of Commons called for the appointment of a select committee to examine the 
defense estimates.  
In late-Victorian Britain, much more than today defense expenditure dominated 
fiscal affairs. Total military expenditure in 1885-1886 amounted to £29.7 million, and 
this exceeded the figures both for interest on the national debt (£23.5 million) and for 
expenditure on civil government (£19.2 million) [Mitchell, 1988, p. 588]. The cost of 
running the GMMEs was a significant element within total military expenditure. For the 
year 1885-1886 it amounted to £2.4 million with the average number of employees 
within those establishments no less than 12,262 [BPP 1887 (C. 5116), p. 625].  
Parliament acceded to Churchill’s request for the appointment of a Select 
Committee with, as noted above, himself as chairperson. In Churchill’s own words, 
“Things went on very well till they came to the accounts of the Ordnance Department, 
and at that period it was absolutely necessary to secure the assistance of what they 
called expert accountants” [Churchill, 1894, p. 492], i.e. Whinney and Waterhouse. 
Churchill insisted that he  
 
did not recollect any two gentlemen who rendered more assistance to a 
[government] committee of that importance than those two gentlemen did in 
unravelling the accounts and making a most clear, lucid, and telling report, 
which he believed had been of immense benefit to the administration of that 
great department [i.e. the War Office]. 
 
As noted above, leading accountants in England had successfully petitioned the 
state for a royal charter to enhance the public perception, and identity, of their 
occupational group through the creation of national organization in 1880. The 
legitimization of a profession is, however, a continuous process. Even where an 
occupational group has achieved sate recognition, it needs to continue “building 
respectability” [Macdonald, 1989] in order to justify such recognition and to convince 
the public of its enhanced status. Whinney commented on the phase occupied by 
accountants in the coveted transition from occupation to professional status at almost 
the same time that Waterhouse met with Lord Randolph Churchill to discuss the 
accounting practices of GMMEs. In his presidential address to members of the ICAEW, 
Whinney [1887, p. 388, emphasis added] observed that “the exigencies of modern life 
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have called into existence certain semi-professions8 of which we form one.” 
Contemporary comment from leading practitioners confirms Whinney’s assessment of 
accountancy within its professionalization process in late-Victorian Britain. For 
example, in Pixley’s [1882, p. 4] estimation, “the profession of a chartered accountant 
[in 1882] is in its infancy.” The contention in this paper is that the engagement of 
W&W to undertake this important government assignment, and their perceived success 
in carrying out this work, represents a meaningful “signal of movement” [Carnegie and 
Edwards, 2001, p. 321] by accountants towards their desired status within the public 
realm. 
Growing concern, on the part of government bureaucracies, with the administration 
of Britain’s GMMEs is next considered, before moving on to a detailed study of the 
work undertaken for the government by W&W. 
 
DISCONNECTED MILITARY MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS 
The supply of armaments to the military was, historically, left as far as practicable 
to the business sector, and this policy remained broadly in place when W&W were 
engaged to advise the government. As observed by a government committee which 
reported in 1887: “As a matter of principle, it appears to us that the Government should 
rely to a considerable extent on the trade for the supply of warlike stores” [BPP 1887 
(C. 5116), p. xxvii]. Indeed, the supply of armaments by the “private trade” [BPP 1887 
(C. 5116), p. 2434] remained in tune with the prevailing political philosophy of laissez-
faire beyond that date. The government had nevertheless extended its armament 
manufacturing facilities during the nineteenth century as the result of serious problems 
of quality and supply manifesting themselves during the Napoleonic Wars and, later, the 
Crimean War [Funnell, 1990; Lewis, 1996, p. 12; Pam, 1998, p. 46]. The expansion of 
weaponry manufacture at the Woolwich Arsenal and elsewhere, however, occurred on a 
piecemeal basis with each GMME “entirely independent of the others and each 
Superintendent [possessing] absolute control of the factory under him” [Hogg, 1963, p. 
828]. Even the manufacturing establishments located on the same site at Woolwich “had 
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 The term “semi-professions” was popularised by Etzioni [1969, p. v] to signal the fact that, for the 
occupational groups which he studied (teachers, nurses and social workers), “[t]heir training is shorter, 
their status is less legitimated, their right to privileged communication less established, there is less of a 
specialized body of knowledge, and they have less autonomy from supervision or societal control that 
‘the’ professions.” Etzioni’s trait-based analysis, however, gives “semi-professions” a different meaning 
from that of Whinney who uses the term to signal an occupational group which aspires to, but had not yet 
achieved, full professional status. 
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no connection with one another” [Hogg, 1963, p. 828]. The outcome was diversity in 
practices and a “want of connexion and co-operation between the factories” [BPP 1887 
(C. 5116), p. xiv]. 
The organizational structure and accounting routines of the GMMEs were placed 
under the microscope by three government committees appointed in the late-1880s: the 
Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Organization and Administration of the 
Manufacturing Departments of the Army chaired by the Earl of Morley (Morley 
Committee, 1887)9 together with the two Select Committees chaired by Lord Randolph 
Churchill: the Select Committee on Army and Navy Estimates (Churchill Committee, 
1887); and the Select Committee on Army Estimates (Churchill Committee, 1888). The 
Morley Committee revealed considerable variation in the ways in which factory 
superintendents discharged their responsibilities and, in the endeavor to improve the 
efficiency of those military units and the co-ordination of their activities, recommended 
the appointment of a single individual to “superintend the whole of the manufacturing 
departments” [BPP 1887 (C. 5116), p. xix]. The Morley Committee also looked into the 
question of whether the principles of consolidation and co-ordination should be applied 
to the accounting practices of the ordnance factories. In response to Morley’s invitation 
to advise the Committee on whether “the [accounting] system could be improved in any 
material particular,” the Accountant and Auditor to the War Office Charles James Hurst 
[BPP 1887 (C. 5116), q. 3580; see also q. 3581] replied: “I should like to see more 
uniformity which might be obtained, and could only be obtained, I presume, from 
having one Accounts Branch in the Arsenal to attend to the whole of this business.”  
The Churchill Committee (1887) also conducted a lengthy interview with Hurst, but 
their conclusion was that his evidence, though valuable, was of too “technical” a 
character to be fully comprehensible to the Committee. It was for this reason, or perhaps 
because they doubted Hurst’s independence, that the Committee requested the authority 
“to obtain, from professional experts independent of the War Office, an opinion as to 
the form and nature of those accounts” [BPP 1887 (239), p. 91]. W&W’s consultancy 
engagement is next examined and evaluated. 
 
CONSULTANTS AT WORK 
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 The Earl of Morley was well-qualified for this role having served as Under-Secretary for War 
(1880-1885) in Gladstone’s second administration [Sanders, 2004]. 
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The report prepared by W&W is reproduced as Appendix No. 1 to the 1888 
Churchill Committee’s First Report (BPP 1888 (120), pp. 117-141), 10 with the authors 
then called before that committee for cross-examination. The fact that the entire process 
is on public record provides a unique opportunity to study the nature and execution of a 
consultancy assignment undertaken by two prominent public accountants soon after the 
creation of the ICAEW in 1880.  
At the time of W&W’s investigation, there existed seven GMMEs – three at the 
Woolwich Arsenal (Royal Carriage Department, Royal Gun Factory, Royal 
Laboratory), the Royal Small Arms factories at Enfield and Birmingham, the Royal 
Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey and the Royal Army Clothing Factory at 
Pimlico. W&W’s terms of reference required them to express an opinion on whether 
“the accounts are correctly kept; whether the form of account is the most convenient and 
intelligible; further, whether the cost of articles is accurately shown, and generally to 
suggest any improvements in the said account” [W&W Report, para. 1]. Their report is 
dated March 2, 1888. Their assessment of the annual financial reporting practices and 
the costing systems then in operation, and the recommendations for change which they 
made, are examined below. 
 
Principal financial reports: W&W undertook a detailed analysis of the accounting 
reports prepared for a single GMME – the Royal Carriage Department – with their 
findings considered to have general application given that the same broad principles 
were applied elsewhere [W&W Report, para. 36]. W&W directed the following 
criticisms at the two main financial statements presented to Parliament, focusing on 
those for 1884-1885 for illustrative purposes:11 
  Balance Sheet No. 1 (Figure 1). The use of the term “Balance Sheet” is 
criticized by W&W [Report, para. 21] as a misnomer: “They are not statements 
setting out the Balances of the Books [as would a company’s balance sheet], but 
Accounts showing in a somewhat confused manner the whole transactions of 
the Department for the year.” The so-called Balance Sheet was in fact a 
statement of the source and application of expenditure on the production of 
armaments. The money voted by parliament for military expenditure is listed on 
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 Their report is referred to here as W&W Report followed by relevant paragraph or page numbers. 
11
 These are reproduced as Appendix No. 1 to W&W’s Report [BPP 1888 (120), pp. 134-135]. 
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the debit side with the cost of services supplied (the “Production Account”) on 
the credit side. Elements of accruals accounting are employed to convert flows 
of cash into flows of goods – in particular, account is taken of the opening and 
closing balances of stores and semi-manufactured articles. W&W [Report, para. 
24] judged the system of accountability to be defective also because the 
published accounts “do not agree with the [War Office] Appropriation 
Account,12 and they do not state clearly what has become of the Manufactures 
of the Departments.” In addition, they concluded that the annual accounts were 
“confused inasmuch as they include items of receipt and expenditure on Capital 
Account [£12,005 2s. 11d,13 Figure 1] in the same Statement [Balance Sheet 
No. 1] with the items composing the cost of their manufactures” [W&W 
Report, para. 24].  Capital Account (Figure 2). W&W [Report, para 23] deemed this statement 
“defective” because it failed to show “the total amount of Capital for which the 
Department is responsible.” Instead it recorded only movements on non-current 
asset (land, buildings, and machinery) accounts during the year [W&W Report, 
para. 10]. 
 
W&W drew fleeting attention to the preparation of a second balance sheet – 
Balance Sheet No. 2 (Figure 3)14 – for each of the GMMEs. Balance Sheet No. 2 was 
first published in the mid-1860s “in response to an objection raised by some 
representatives of the Chambers of Commerce that the results recorded in the official 
publication known as the “Priced Vocabulary of Stores used in Her Majesty’s Service,” 
[were] made up without including Depreciation and Interest as part of Cost” [W&W 
Report, para 22]. Their concern was that, when reaching make or buy decisions, the 
omission of such costs negated comparisons between government costs of production 
and prices charged for similar weapons by the business sector.15 The depreciation and 
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 These report amounts issued by the Treasury, under the authority of Parliament, to individual 
government departments. 
13
 Prior to the decimalization of the British currency on February 15, 1971, there were 12 “old” 
pence (d) to the shilling (s) and 20 shillings to the pound sterling (£). 
14
 This financial statement is not included in W&W’s Report probably because, as will be shown 
below, it was generally ignored by them when formulating their criticism of prevailing practices. The 
copy reproduced as Figure 3 is taken from BPP 1886 (109), p. 5. 
15
 Hurst drew attention to the fact that India Office and the Colonies were treated in the same manner 
as external suppliers when computing relevant cost figures, i.e. the charges made for the supply of 
armaments were based on the numbers contained in Balance Sheet No. 2. In contrast, charges made to the 
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interest charges at the Royal Carriage Department for 1884-1885 totaled £27,421 16s 
7¼d (Figure 3).16  
Finally, W&W expressed a general concern that “delay in the preparation of these 
accounts has been such as to render publication of comparatively little value” [W&W, 
para. 65].17 In their estimation, the accounts prepared for each GMME should reveal the 
following in order to achieve effective accountability [W&W Report, para. 25]: 
 
1. The amount of the supplies received under each Sub-Head of the Votes. 
2. Total cost of production. 
3. The recipients of goods manufactured. 
4. Stores and other assets belonging to the department. 
W&W devised two principal financial statements to fulfil those requirements  The Secretary of State in Account with the Department [W&W Report, para 26, 
p. 138]. The opening credit balance, in the proposed statement, comprised the 
book “value of the assets [recognised] in the hands of the [manufacturing] 
Department” at the beginning of the year, £366,447 6s 0¼d (Figure 4). Given 
that those assets were financed by money advanced from the Secretary of State 
for War, the balance represents the financial accountability of the Royal 
Carriage Department to Parliament at the beginning of the year. The account 
was designed to receive credits for cash voted by Parliament and advanced to 
the department during the year, plus miscellaneous supplies transferred from 
other sources. The account is debited with the cost of goods manufactured 
during the year plus the cost of any services supplied to other departments. The 
closing balance therefore represented the amount due to the Secretary of State 
at the end of the year, £382,814 14s 8¾d (Figure 4).18 This financial record, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Navy – an internal customer funded in the same manner as the Army, through money voted by Parliament 
– were based on figures reported in Balance Sheet No. 1 [BPP 1890 (57), p. 155]. 
16 For a full discussion of the role of accounting in ensuring ǲfair competitionǳ between private 
sector companies and GMMEs, see Edwards [2015], and for the evolution of accounting practices within GMME’s up to the time of W&W’s Report, see also Black and Edwards [forthcoming]. 
17
 Major General Eardley Maitland confirmed: “that is a point upon which the Departments have 
been somewhat slack” [BPP 1888 (120), q. 443]. A particular problem was that the War Office failed to 
supply some of the required cost figures until six or seven months after the end of the accounting period 
[BPP 1888 (212), q. 2177]. 
18
 The statement also contains debits for the annual depreciation charge that should have been 
included in manufacturing costs (this could not be done by W&W when rearranging available numbers 
for the purpose of constructing their recommended financial statements because it was not the practice of 
the department to so do – see further below) and assets transferred to the Commissary-General of 
Ordnance. 
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consistent with tradition within the government sector, is a charge and 
discharge statement recording the accountability of the Superintendent of the 
Royal Carriage Department (as agent) to the Secretary of State (as principal).   Balance Sheet [W&W Report, para 26 and Figure 5]. This document is the 
equivalent of the private sector company balance sheet. It lists all the 
department’s liabilities and assets at the year-end, with the difference between 
them “representing and agreeing with the amount to the credit of the Secretary 
of State” at the end of the year [W&W Report, para 26], i.e. £382,814 14 8¾ 
(Figure 5). Within Figure 5, therefore, this amount might be considered the 
equivalent of shareholders’ equity in a corporate balance sheet.  
Additional “subsidiary accounts,” designed to “show the internal working of the 
Department and how the cost of its manufactures is arrived at,” were recommended by 
W&W [Report, para 30]. These were titled: manufacturing account; materials account; 
wages account; and indirect expenditure account. When called before the Select 
Committee for questioning on the content of their report, W&W argued that these 
additional accounting statements were required “to obtain a clear idea of each” main 
head of expense [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2122].  
Reviewing the contents of W&W’s Report and the other evidence collected, the 
Select Committee on Army Estimates concluded that “it would seem to be highly 
desirable that the form of account which they suggest should receive the careful 
attention of the Secretary of State” [BPP 1888 (120), p. v].  
 
Costing practices: When the Select Committee examined W&W on the content of their 
consultancy report later that month (April 1888), the main focus of attention was the 
costing system in operation within the various GMMEs, though the nature of the costing 
system naturally had direct implications for the content of the published accounts. Some 
years later H. J. Gibson who, as Assistant Comptroller and Auditor in the Exchequer 
and Audit Department, claimed to possess “special experience in dealing with 
manufacturing and store accounts of the Army and Navy,” emphasized the importance 
of proper costing [BPP 1907 (Cd. 3615), q. 4751]. He drew attention to the fact that the 
“ordnance factories are practically a separate entity; they are a manufacturing 
department, who supply their articles to the Army, Navy, Colonies, and India.” 
Therefore, in his estimation, it was “important that their customers should be charged 
the true cost” [BPP 1907 (Cd. 3615), q. 4760]. 
14 
 
W&W [Report, para. 10] observed that the annual financial reports prepared for 
Parliament already contained “very detailed schedules of the number and cost of the 
articles completed or services rendered during the year,” with the costing system in 
operation described as follows [W&W Report, para. 16, emphasis added]:  
 
In the Cost Ledger an Account is opened for every order for manufacture received 
from the Commissary General, and to this Account is posted monthly the amount of 
materials used and wages expended, and also the amount of indirect expenditure 
when ascertained after the close of the year. Such indirect expenditure is exclusive 
of interest and depreciation. 
 
W&W [Report, para 9, emphasis added; see also para 65] made complementary 
comments concerning the overall operation of the costing system: “The Cost and other 
Ledgers connected therewith are kept with great minuteness, and are intended to show 
accurately the exact cost price of the articles manufactured or Services Performed, such 
as Repairs, Conversions, &c.” Moreover, W&W judged the objective of the costing 
system to be broadly achieved: “It appears to us that by these accounts the cost of each 
article is ascertained as closely as circumstances will permit” [W&W Report, para. 16]. 
Therefore, “We have not proposed to interfere with the Cost Ledger at all,” nor “sought 
to interfere with the schedules” presented to parliament that provided a build-up of the 
cost of producing each article [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2140, q. 2142].  
A key question which the Select Committee decided to explore, and one that is a 
constant throughout the history of cost accounting, is: “What is cost?” As the prominent 
liberal politician, Hugh Childers, expressed the matter: “Is not the object of the accounts 
themselves to see how much the articles which Parliament trusts the Government to 
have manufactured in the Manufacturing Establishments really have cost?” [BPP 1888 
(212), q. 2131, emphasis added]. W&W’s reply was in the affirmative, but the question 
of how the books should be kept and the accounts prepared depended on the reason for 
calculating cost. Were the figures for cost designed to reflect accountability to 
Parliament for the actual amounts of cash advanced or was their purpose to enable fair 
comparisons to be made with the prices charged for the supply of armaments by private 
sector companies?19 Resistance to the preparation of separate financial statements for 
                                                        
19
 As noted above, there was almost complete reliance on the private sector to supply military needs 
up to the nineteenth century. For a number of reasons, including reliability of supply and the quality of 
the armaments, government provision increased. Given the contemporary political philosophy of laissez-
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each purpose appears to have been as strong in the nineteenth century as it is today 
[International Accounting Standards Board, 2010] and, as today, gave rise to the 
challenge of crafting multi-purpose financial statements. A further complication in the 
resolution of these issues was disagreement between witnesses concerning the substance 
and content of prevailing accounting practices. 
W&W claimed that the existing system did not lead to the identification of “true 
cost” for the purpose of fair comparison with private sector firms when reaching make 
or buy decisions. Specifically, they pointed out that the cost schedules included in the 
published accounts contained “no amount for rent, Government taxes, fire insurance, 
depreciation on buildings and machinery, or interest on Capital” [W&W Report, para. 
22]. Ralph Knox, Accountant General at the War Office, rejected these claims: “rates 
and taxes are included in balance sheet No. 1, and in balance sheet No. 2 all the other 
items to which they refer are shown; they [W&W] seem to have been criticising balance 
sheet No. 1 as if balance sheet No. 2 were not in existence” [BPP 1888 (120), q. 1331].  
The truth of the matter lay somewhere between the two viewpoints. Knox’s claim 
that rates and taxes were included as was rent [BPP 1888 (120), q. 1331; see also q. 
1334] was, in the main, dismissed by W&W. Whinney agreed that local rates were 
included but insisted, correctly, that government taxes were not.20 He also argued that 
Knox’s claim that rent featured in the accounts was entirely disingenuous, given that it 
comprised trivial payments relating to a few cottages and for ground rent at the clothing 
factory in Pimlico [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2070].  
Turning to the treatment of depreciation, W&W made much of their determination 
to ensure that this was included as part of the computed cost of production. Their report 
criticizes Balance Sheet No. 1 on the grounds that depreciation is “not included in the 
cost of the work done” [W&W Report, para. 10] and, as revealed in Figure 4, their 
recommended alternative financial statement – “The Secretary of State in Account with 
the Department” – exhibited the following item: “To Depreciation of Buildings and 
Machinery which should have been added to the Cost of the items above.” When 
interviewed by the committee, W&W insisted that depreciation was “a fair charge as 
against the cost of any article” [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2117], while their report contained 
                                                                                                                                                                  
faire, however, the appropriate balance between public and private provision was the subject of 
continuing debate. 
20
 GMMEs did not sell their outputs and, therefore, had no profits to tax.  
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the clear-cut recommendation that “depreciation should be dealt with as part of cost, and 
distributed over the articles manufactured” [W&W Report, para. 22; see also para. 29].21  
Here Knox’s complaint that W&W “seem to have been criticising balance sheet No. 
1 as if balance sheet No. 2 were not in existence” [BPP 1888 (120), q. 1331] was 
entirely justified. Figures for interest (£12,931 19s 2d and £2,341 17s 9¾d) and 
depreciation (£12,147 19s 7½d), which appear as debit balances in Balance Sheet No. 2 
(Figure 3), undoubtedly form part of the total cost of good produced reported in Balance 
Sheet No. 2 as £323,879 11s 3¼d (Figure 3). This can be confirmed by studying the 
detailed cost statements (C-I) supplied to parliament for each GMME. Those for the 
Royal Carriage Department, for example [BPP 1886 (109) on pages 6-53], report, for 
every component of every product manufactured, the materials cost, labor cost and 
share of indirect expenses aggregating:  First, to the Production Account totals in Balance Sheet No. 1 (£296,457 14s 
8d, Figure 1), and   Second, with depreciation and interest added (£27,421 16s 7¼d, Figure 3), to 
the Production Account totals in Balance Sheet No. 2 (£323,879 11s 3¼d, 
Figure 3).  
Any assessment of the comparability of GMME and private sector company 
accounting practices involves a need to review the items included in the accounts of the 
latter as well as the former. For example, company accounts would not have included 
rental charges where premises were owned nor interest charges where the company had 
no need to rely on borrowing to fund its activities. Moreover, there was the possibility 
that the calculated unit costs of GMMEs were, in certain respects, overstated compared 
with those of private sector companies. In particular, the accounts of government 
departments included superannuation costs for employees whereas this rarely formed 
part of the remuneration package of private sector employees. Again, however, the 
position was not clear-cut, with the possibility that private sector employees were paid 
more to compensate for the absence of superannuation arrangements [BPP 1888 (212), 
q. 2071]. As Whinney wisely observed, “It is not easy to make a fair comparison 
between the two” [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2071].  
To increase the likelihood of fair comparison between calculated government 
manufacturing costs and the prices charged for weaponry by private sector companies, it 
                                                        
21
 Also, “The charge for depreciation, we think, should be spread over the cost of the articles; there is 
no question about that” [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2111]. 
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would be necessary to create accounting numbers, e.g., a notional figure rent. This was 
not a course the accounting consultants were willing to follow. Whinney described 
imputed rent as a “fancy item,” interest on capital as “a very fancy item,” and the 
inclusion of either simply a “matter of taste and opinion” [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2075, q. 
2088]. The adopted stance possibly reflected the decision to privilege accountability to 
Parliament ahead of relevant data for make or buy decisions. When W&W agreed that 
“the approximate cost of every article is fairly represented in the accounts” [BPP 1888 
(212), q. 2076], this probably reflected their conviction that it was more important to be 
aware of the limitations of accounting numbers when making business decisions than to 
include “fancy” items which might damage rather than enhance the validity 
comparisons between cost calculations for GMMEs and prices charged by private sector 
companies.  
Finally, the question of how other indirect expenses should be re-charged to 
individual products manufactured needed to be addressed. W&W drew attention to the 
general practice of recovering indirect expenditure incurred by GMMEs as a percentage 
of direct wages [W&W Report, para 32]; indeed this was the system of overhead 
recovery that John Anderson explained was in operation at the Royal Gun Factory, 
where he was Assistant Superintendent, at least from 1860 [BPP 1860 (441), q. 6083]. 
W&W recognised the fact that more precise systems of apportionment were sometimes 
used by companies, e.g., based on machine hour,22 but their conclusion was that “such 
niceties of calculation are hardly necessary under the circumstance of the Department” 
[W&W Report, para 32].23 
The extent to which W&W’s recommendations were implemented is next assessed 
by examining changes made to government military accounting practices over the next 
twenty years or so.  
 
NEW ACCOUNTING 
                                                        
22
 This treatment was probably exceptional in 1887. Garcke and Fells [1889, pp. 72-73] oft-cited text 
on Factory Accounts, published around that time, confined attention to the recovery of indirect costs as a 
percentage of direct labour or of direct labour plus direct materials. It was only during the scientific 
management era of the early twentieth century that the machine rate method began to be more widely 
advocated [Boyns and Edwards, 2013, pp. 175-176]. 
23
 A detailed explanation of the operation of the costing system generally in 1887 was provided by 
Charles D. Piper, principal clerk, Royal Carriage Department. He explained the steps taken to help ensure 
that expenditure was properly allotted to each article and the method of recovering overhead expenditure 
which he believed could not be improved upon [BPP 1887 (C. 5116), q. 5500; see also qq. 5501-5505]. 
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Government investigations examined above resulted in two structural changes in the 
administration of GMMEs. First, the GMMEs were placed under the control of a single 
Director-General of Ordnance Factories. Second, the whole of the anticipated 
expenditure on ordnance services was the subject of a separate vote instead of being 
split between the planned expenditure of the army and admiralty [BPP 1890 (57), p. 
155].  
 
Under these altered circumstances, it was decided by the Secretary of State to 
render and present to Parliament one consolidated balance sheet for the 
Ordnance Factories (in harmony with the details of the Ordnance Factories’ 
Vote), instead of separate accounts for each department.  
 
Henceforth, in line with recommendations made by W&W, the expenditures 
reported in the balance sheet were “identical with the amounts shown in the 
Appropriation Accounts” [BPP1890 (57), p. 156 and cf. BPP 1890 (57), p.2, p.4, BPP 
1890 (22), p. 2]. 
W&W’s proposal for the publication of a financial statement entitled “The 
Secretary of State in Account with the Department” was not acted upon. The label 
“Balance Sheet,” previously used to describe the principal statement of accountability to 
Parliament, was replaced by “Balance Sheet and Production Account” (Figure 6), and it 
may be that this change was made to accommodate W&W’s complaint that the term 
“Balance Sheet” was incorrectly employed.24 Certainly, the new label continued to 
describe a statement of resource flows designed, as before, to report the cost of 
armaments manufactured during the year and the funding received from Parliament for 
that purpose.  
The newly-branded financial statement (Figure 6) was, substantially, the old 
Balance Sheet No. 2 (Figure 3), with Balance Sheet No. 1 no longer featuring in returns 
made to Parliament. The content of the “Balance Sheet and Production Account” took 
no account of W&W’s recommendation that the primary statement of financial 
accountability to Parliament should report the amounts due to the Secretary of State at 
the beginning and end of the year, representing “the value of the assets in the hands of 
the Department” on those dates (Figure 4). Instead, the only assets recognised in the 
account (as before) were the opening and closing balance of stores and semi-
                                                        
24
 The returns to Parliament revert to use of the term balance sheet from 1896-1897, signalling how 
difficult it can be to achieve accounting change. 
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manufactured articles.25 The only substantive difference between the old and new 
“Balance Sheets” (Figures 3 and 6) was that the latter now omitted the figure for interest 
on capital invested, which seems to reflect W&W’s overall sentiments on that issue, 
though there did exist an element of difference between them [BPP 1888 (212), qq. 
2088-2091].  
W&W’s recommendation for the publication of a business-type balance sheet, 
which included a capital account, was first acted upon when preparing the returns to 
parliament for the year 1892-1893. The new financial report was labelled “Statement of 
Liabilities and Assets” (Figure 8) perhaps because the term balance sheet continued to 
feature within the “Balance Sheet and Production Account” (Figure 6).  
Of the “subsidiary accounts” recommended by W&W, only the statement of 
indirect expenses26 for each military establishment, which is where W&W believed 
“waste and mismanagement would show themselves” [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2098], 
featured in exactly the proposed form in the annual reporting package for GMMEs 
developed in the early 1890s. Recommendations for the publication of separate 
manufacturing accounts, materials accounts and wages accounts were not adopted in the 
form proposed by W&W, though roughly similar data was reported in the “Statement of 
Manufactures”27 and the “Details of the Cost of Work.”28 The former document 
supplied, for each GMME, an enormous amount of detail, i.e. the cost and numbers 
produced of every component of each different types of output (i.e. field artillery, 
machine guns, repairs, ammunition, gunpowder, etc.) and, beginning with the financial 
year 1890-1891 [BPP 1892 (129), passim], also their cost per unit, called the “rate.” In 
addition, as recommended by W&W, these statements reported the destination of the 
goods manufactured at GMMEs, i.e. the army, navy, India and the colonies.29  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
                                                        
25
 The carrying value of fixed assets continued to be reported pre-and post W&W only in the 
“Capital Account” (Figure 7). 
26
 This statement also reported, for each GMME, overhead recovery rates based on direct labour 
costs. 
27
 Re-titled “Production Statements” in 1896-1897.  
28
 Renamed “Abstract of Productions” in 1890-1891 and “General Abstract of Cost of Work” in 
1901-1902. There were other minor changes in wording and, sometimes, differences between the 
descriptions of financial statements in the list of contents and in the headings of those documents. 
29
 The amount of production and costing data returned to Parliament was curtailed significantly in 
1907-1908. Henceforth details of cost, units and cost per unit were provided only on the basis of 
destination (army, navy, India, the colonies), i.e. analysis by manufacturing department was abandoned. 
This enabled the length of the annual return to be reduced from 472 pages for 1906-1907 to 177 pages in 
1907-1908 [BPP 1908 (52); BPP 1909 (16)]. 
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Existing sources attach considerable significance to the part played by W&W in 
bringing about accounting change within Britain’s GMMEs in the latter years of the 
nineteenth century. In evidence presented to the Departmental Committee on Accounts 
of Local Authorities [BPP 1907 (Cd. 3615), q. 4757], H. J. Gibson recounted that “an 
important Committee presided over by Lord Randolph Churchill, on Army and Navy 
Expenditure” appointed “two professional accountants, Messrs. Whinney and 
Waterhouse, to investigate the [accounting] system” within GMMEs. Further, that those 
“gentlemen made a very full report and sketched out new forms of account, which were 
in the main adopted and are still in force.” Similar sentiments were expressed by Sir 
Charles Harris, Assistant Financial Secretary at the War Office, in evidence presented to 
the Committee on Public Accounts ten years later [BPP 1917-1918 (123), p. 214]: 
 
About 1890 it was recognised that the internal accounts of the factories were 
open to criticism, and during the next five or more years the administration and 
accounting of the factories were completely remodelled, with the result that 
eminent Accountants called in to give advice on the subject, as well as (it is 
believed) the Comptroller and Auditor-General, were satisfied that the results 
shown were what they claimed to be, namely – the true cost to Government of 
the things manufactured. 
 
Brigadier Hogg, formerly Assistant Master General of the Ordnance at the War 
Office, was well placed to recount the course of accounting change when compiling his 
authoritative history of the Royal Arsenal [Higham, 1964]. Hogg [1963, p. 873] 
described the system of accounting in operation at the time the Morley Committee 
reported (1887) as “not a particularly accurate system and failed to give an exact picture 
of the cost of production since it was impossible to apportion accurately the indirect 
expenditure between the various orders.” In his estimation, W&W “proposed a special 
form of accounts for the factories which was adopted” [Hogg, 1963, p. 873]. More 
specifically, changes designed to achieve more reliable cost figures were introduced 
because of “the increased importance then being attached to the comparisons between 
government and trade prices for similar articles” [Hogg, 1963, p. 874]. The evidence 
presented in this paper indicates that these claims possibly exaggerate W&W’s 
contribution to the development of costing and financial reporting practices within 
GMMEs. 
Starting with the costing system, the identification of the various components of 
total cost, i.e. direct materials, direct labor and indirect expenses, remained, in 
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substance, unchanged by events circa. 1888-1889. As noted above, W&W clearly stated 
that “We have not proposed to interfere with the Cost Ledger at all” nor with the 
“schedules” presented to parliament that provided a detailed build-up of the cost of 
producing each article [BPP 1888 (212), q. 2140, q. 2142; see also Black and Edwards, 
forthcoming]. Moreover, the Accountant and Auditor to the War Office, Charles James 
Hurst, advised the Morley Committee and Churchill’s Committees that it was over a 
quarter of a century earlier that that the financial reporting and costing systems were the 
subject of major improvements that remained in place in 1887. An investigation 
undertaken by Hurst in 1862 [BPP 1862 (448), pp. 182-188] revealed that the existing 
costing system was unscientific and provided only a very rough approximation of the 
actual costs incurred [BPP 1887 (C. 5116), qq. 3368-3382]. Changes then put in place, 
according to Hurst, created “the present system [which] is as good as any system that 
can be applied or that is applied in any of the large establishments of the kingdom” 
[BPP 1887 (C. 5116), q. 3383]. The possibility that Churchill had reservations 
concerning the objectivity of Hurst’s assessment led to W&W’s appointment but, 
following their report, the fundamental structure of the costing system in operation in 
the GMMEs remained broadly the same as it was before.  
An important amendment to the financial reporting system which can be attributed 
to W&W saw the replacement of Balance Sheets No. 1 and No. 2 by a single financial 
statement, and this change had implications for the detailed content of the costing 
system. The difference between Balance Sheets No. 1 and No. 2 was that interest on 
capital and depreciation was included in the latter but not in the former. Henceforth the 
single financial statement contained a charge for depreciation whereas the Secretary of 
State decided no longer “to charge the factories with interest on capital” [BPP 1890 
(57), p. 155]. This latter change was in accordance with W&W’s recommendation, but 
there is no certainty that it resulted in better information for decision making.30 The 
Report from the Committee of Public Accounts [BPP 1917-1918 (123), pp. xiii-ix] 
summarized the consequence of the omission of interest as follows: “Accounts [of 
GMMEs] deal only with actual expenditure incurred [by the Government] and do not 
embrace such elements as profit, interest on capital or rent of Government lands in any 
                                                        
30
 The omission of interest might also have been a response to complaints that it was unfair to use 
Balance Sheet 2 figures (which included interest) for the purpose of costing supplies of weaponry to the 
Indian government and the Colonies whereas Balance Sheet No. 1 figures (which excluded interest) were 
used to cost supplies to the Navy [BPP 1890 (57), p. 155, p. 162; Hansard, House of Commons, March 
25, 1892, Fourth Series, Vol. 2, Col. 1880]. 
22 
 
form, and the results are not exactly comparable with contractors’ prices.” The issue of 
“fancy” items which W&W were keen to bury was back up for discussion.  
In one other respect W&W’s Report does appear to have brought about significant 
accounting innovation, namely the adoption of the commercial form of balance sheet – 
the Statement of Liabilities and Assets (Figure 8). It was a form of financial statement 
discussed again and again down the years – for example, by the Committee on the Form 
of Government Accounts, 1950 [BPP 1950 (Cmd. 7969)] – and which assumed 
prominence only in recent decades as part of the New Public Management reforms. 
Turning to the question of the professionalization of the accountancy occupational 
group, the perceived value of W&W’s consultancy engagement was undoubtedly 
important irrespective of its intrinsic worth. Influential members of the state apparatus 
such as Churchill, Gibson and Harris believed, or at least claimed to believe, that W&W 
had made an important contribution to both the costing practices and public 
accountability of GMMEs. It is also clear that the state continued to value Waterhouse’s 
professional expertise given that he was “subsequently asked to conduct similar 
investigations into the Admiralty’s dockyards (1888-89) and the Royal Ordnance 
factories (1901)” [Jones, 1988, p. 30]. Waterhouse was also invited to sit on the Joint 
Stock Companies Departmental Committee which reported in 1895 and on the 
Company Law Amendment Committee of 1906.  
Not all Waterhouse’s dealings with the state bore fruit. One of his Presidential 
initiatives was to lead the campaign to establish the type of professional monopoly for 
chartered accountants, through state registration, already enjoyed by medical 
practitioners [Stacey, 1954; Macdonald, 1985, p. 546; Macdonald, 1995, chapter 7; 
Walker and Shackleton, 1995]. Waterhouse’s campaign did not meet with state approval 
and, therefore, failed to achieve a form of recognition capable of quickly creating, for 
accountants, professional legitimacy within the public domain. The work undertaken in 
collaboration with Frederick Whinney nevertheless comprised a high-profile 
engagement that deserves recognition as a “signal of movement” [Carnegie and 
Edwards, 2001] along the pathway from “semi” to full professional status. 
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FIGURE 1 
Balance Sheet No. 1 of Royal Carriage Department, 1884-1885 
 
Source: W&W Report [1888, p. 134] 
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FIGURE 2 
Capital Account of Royal Carriage Department, 1884-1885 
 
 
 
Source: W&W Report [1888, p. 135]  
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FIGURE 3 
Balance Sheet No. 2 of Royal Carriage Department, 1884-1885 
 
 
Source: BPP [1886 (109), p. 5] 
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FIGURE 4 
W&W recommended form of accounts: the Secretary of State in Account with the 
Department  
 
Source: W&W Report [1888, p. 138]  
 
FIGURE 5 
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W&W recommended form of accounts: Balance Sheet 
 
 
 
Source: W&W Report [1888, p. 139]  
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FIGURE 6 
Royal Ordnance Factories Balance Sheet and Production Account 
1888-1889 
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Source: BPP [1890 (57), pp. 2-5] 
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FIGURE 7 
Royal Ordnance Factories Capital Account, 1888-1889 
  
Source: BPP [1890 (57), pp. 6-7] 
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FIGURE 8 
Royal Ordnance Factories Statement of Assets and Liabilities at March 31, 1893 
 
Source: BPP [1894 (61), p. 9] 
